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From Solid Modern Utopia to Liquid Modern Anti-Utopia? 
- Tracing the Utopian Strand in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman 
 
Michael Hviid Jacobsen 
 
“A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth 
even glancing at, for it leaves out the country at which 
humanity is always landing. And when humanity lands there, it 
looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the 
realization of Utopias” 
(Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism, 27) 
 
Where Do we Go From Here, Nowhere? 
Utopia literally means ‘nowhere’. Most often, however, utopian thought and practice have 
pointed to a ‘somewhere’, a tangible and definable expression of the ‘nowhere’ and have often been 
presented as a positive mirror image (a eutopia) or a deliberately distorted and negative picture of 
contemporary reality (a dystopia or anti-utopia), the ‘here and now’, but today these previously 
flourishing ‘somewheres’ everywhere appear to be gradually dismantled, dissolving, or 
disillusioned. Thus, as Bruce Mazlish recently and poignantly pointed out, “utopian thinking, 
except in the form of messianic or fundamentalist aspirations, appears either to take other shapes or 
be in the tepid condition or non-existent” (43). His description of the vanishing or transformation of 
utopias is correct in as far as it pertains to the recent development in and destiny of social or 
political utopias because within literary or filmic genres such as science fiction or virtual reality, 
utopian ideas are indeed still very much made available by different agencies and individuals. 
Therefore, the demise of utopia is primarily associated with the spheres of either politics or science, 
and particularly social science, which have become disenchanted in the process of ‘de-
utopianisation’ and have lost the visions and utopias which for centuries guided the founders, 
pioneers and practitioners of these domains and pointed in the direction of ‘the common good’, the 
‘just society’, etc. At the same time especially the social sciences may very well have lost their own 
raison d’être and the justification of its own practice in the process 
The demise of utopia is, however, perhaps premature. Not everybody accepts this tragic 
disappearance of utopias and the limitations of mind, fantasy, ingenuity and creativity that 
underpins and is promoted by it. Polish sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, whose books have sold 
better than most cookery or sexual guidance books in many parts of the European continent 
and for years have topped sales lists of academic literature especially in Europe, is one of 
those few and far between key social thinkers who refuse to allow utopian aspirations to 
wither away without pointing to the appalling effects this would have on thought as well as on 
social reality. Thus, Bauman states in one of his recent books:i 
 
The Utopias of yore stand condemned in the new global elite’s Weltanschauung and life philosophy. 
Their two most crucial attributes—territoriality and finality—disqualify past Utopias and bar in advance 
all future attempts to re-enter the line of thinking they once followed. … ‘Utopia’—in its original 
meaning of a place that does not exist—has become, within the logic of the globalized world, a 
contradiction in terms. The ‘nowhere’ (the ‘forever nowhere’, the ‘thus-far nowhere’ and the ‘nowhere-
as-yet’ alike) is no longer a place. The ‘U’ of ‘Utopia’ bereaved by the topos, is left homeless and 
floating, no longer hoping to strike roots, to ‘re-embed’. … The utopian model of a ‘better future’ is out 
of the question. (Liquid Modernity, 236-39) 
 
Bauman’s diagnosis, according to which thinking and imagination—due to transformation from a 
modern to a markedly postmodern or liquid modern world—has taken a U-turn from utopia being 
firmly embedded in a topos to belonging to a spaceless and visionless desert, is indeed a sinister and 
sombre perspective. It is on the surface a pessimistic perspective pinpointing the problems posed by 
a globalised and individualised social world that has altogether forgotten to imagine alternative 
ways to organise itself and to think differently than what currently appears real and tangible.ii This 
tendency for passivity, indifference and defeatism that Bauman locates among politicians as well as 
ordinary people has for decades permeated the sociological discourse within which the tradition of 
‘realism’ has found or usurped a new stronghold. 
Realism is, without doubt, the worst enemy of utopianism. At the same time, any science 
dealing with realms of reality, in some form or the other, will have to accept realism unless facing 
accusations of metaphysical or idealist tendencies. Bauman is, however, not such a realist. Already 
early in his authorship in Towards a Critical Sociology (1976) he criticised what he regarded as the 
‘science of unfreedom’ which especially realist understandings of social science promoted. These 
positions, such as Durkheimian and Parsonian sociology—hence his neologism ‘Durksonianism’—
according to him had a tendency to naturalise the world, allow common sense to prevail and 
anaesthetise any kind of creativity, critical thinking and human ingenuity regarding the creation of a 
better or at least alternative world. Bauman’s own sociology has for almost half a century attempted 
to reappropriate this sense of alternatives on behalf of people and social thinkers alike and allow 
them to be expressed without fearing or facing ridicule and ostracism. In a vein similar to the 
utopian ideas expressed by German philosopher Ernst Bloch in The Spirit of Utopia (2000), 
Bauman, although his Marxist allegiances are more subdued, also proposes a sociology that can 
inform people about the possibilities and alternatives that are still open to them, the horizons not yet 
discovered and the uncharted territories (Jacobsen, “Ikke endnu”, 73-4). His utopianism, as this 
article will seek to demonstrate, is not overtly expressed but runs like an undercurrent throughout 
his many books, all written within the field of sociology but with much more wide-ranging 
potentials than rigid or clear-cut disciplinary boundaries can capture. 
Due to the aforementioned stress on realism, sociology, by purpose or by default, has 
gradually alienated itself from utopianism and what is generally regarded as unscientific 
speculations. In this respect, sociology has mirrored the changes in social reality very well indeed. 
The derogatory evaluation is often heard in contemporary society that someone’s opinions or beliefs 
are ‘purely utopian’, hereby designating them as speculative or utterly unrealisable and unrealistic. 
This has been the case for quite some time (Hacker, 135). Utopian thought, instead of marking the 
epitome of abstract and elevated thinking as it did for many centuries, has now apparently turned 
into an embarrassment in the eyes of many people who are only looking for immediate or instant 
obsolescence as well as maximum impact, as Georg Steiner in his pithy aphorism in Exterritorial 
(1975) believed to be the sign of the times which he captured by the term “casino culture”. 
Especially sociology and the other social sciences are in this respect notorious for their denigration 
of utopian thinking and their degradation of utopian thinkers. This tendency may well be regarded 
as a relic from the previous decade dominated by exponents of realism within prevailing traditions 
such as positivism and scientific Marxism. Neither had any positive sentiments left for utopianism, 
which for most parts of the twentieth century was devalued within the social sciences.iii In this 
sense, Bauman offers sociology in particular and the social sciences in general a unique opportunity 
for rediscovering utopianism as a fertile ground for theorising as well as a way of re-forging the 
ancient link between theory and action, the vita contemplativa with the vita activa. Below I examine 
the presence and shifts in utopian sympathies throughout Bauman’s more than thirty books since 
the mid-twentieth century. 
 
The Long Road from Marxist Utopia to Liquid Modern Anti-Utopia 
Bauman’s sociological career started out as an insider critic of the communist utopia in 
Eastern Europe but prior to this he was, according to his wife’s personal memoirs, actually a 
devoted and loyal member of the Communist Party (J. Bauman, 45). A change occurred in the mid-
1950s as a result of personal persecution due to his Jewish background and due to accusations of 
subservient and counter-revolutionary attitudes again in the late 1960s. Purges on behalf of the 
Party led to his life-long exile in Leeds, England—a base from which he has written on matters of 
sociology, philosophy, politics, and morality. One of his first overt statements of utopianism 
appeared in a book published shortly after his arrival in England, Socialism: The Active Utopia, in 
which he made it clear that he supported utopianism as a ‘relativisation’ of the reality of the present 
through which one is capable of “exposing the partiality of current reality, by scanning the field of 
the possible in which the real occupies merely a tiny plot [that] pave[s] the way for a critical activity 
which alone can transform the present predicament of man” (13). Already here it is obvious that 
utopianism is for Bauman equivalent to change, transformation, possibility, transcendence, and 
critical activity and not stasis, order, rigidity, and structure. Understood in this vein, his utopianism 
shares some similarities with Victor W. Turner’s description in The Ritual Process (1969) of the 
open-ended communitas—opposed to the societas demanding structure and order—as sources of 
togetherness bringing forth human spontaneity, self-constitution, experimentation, and 
transformation. In short, Bauman seeks to promote an understanding of what he terms an “active 
utopia”, and for several years he placed his hopes for such an active form of human utopian striving 
under the auspices of socialism. 
As Bauman indicated in the quotation above regarding the loss of utopian ideas and of 
physical topos in contemporary society, he is anxious to point out that our utopian aspirations have 
come under attack in recent years in the capitalist and consumerist West. However, he also became 
bitterly aware that the enforced communism and state socialism of his youth did not offer a 
satisfying utopia either. Thus, Bauman’s utopian strand, in which utopianism is constituted by 
creative human activity, has been part and parcel of his writings from the very early years as an 
‘organic’ and ‘legislating’ intellectual in state socialist Poland to his later years as a ‘free-floating’ 
intellectual and ‘interpreter’ in the West (Morawski, 35), but his utopianism has nevertheless 
changed radically throughout this period. Therefore, one could wonder whether his variant of 
utopianism did not originally stem from a desire to escape exactly the enforced conformity of state 
socialism. Moreover, the reason why it persisted even after his successful escape from these 
regimes in the late 1960s could be interpreted as a consequence of disillusion from encountering the 
reality of postmodernity in the West, holding so much promise but unable to deliver. One could 
claim that his utopianism has persisted because the postmodern age turned out to be a 
pandemonium instead of the promised paradise. Whether this is the case or not is difficult to 
determine, but the fact remains that Bauman has not given up the hope that reality may be different 
from what it used to be and how it currently is. 
Socialism, however, has been the breeding-ground for much utopian thinking throughout the 
last couple of centuries (cf. Ulam, Claeys). Utopianism runs like a leitmotif through most socialist 
writings and is even found implicitly in those so-called ‘scientific Marxists’ blatantly denouncing it. 
This socialist inclination for utopian ideas may also be the reason behind Bauman’s own 
predilection for his variant of it, despite consequently expressing an aversion towards the social 
experiments launched in the name of state socialism or structural Marxism. In the middle of the 
nineteenth century Marx was angered by the so-called utopian socialists who in their transcendental 
consciousness were world-weary and exhibited a starry-eyed attitude towards the future horizons 
instead of focussing attention upon the urgent and necessary task of bringing about revolutionary 
change. His major attacks were directed at Pierre Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin as much as 
against Robert Owen and Charles Fourier who with their combined anarchism and utopianism all 
apparently forfeited the chance of making the capitalist order crumble. Bauman is not so much 
angered as he is worried by the fact that apathy and a spectator attitude among most people appear 
to be the widespread response to the troubles and difficulties faced daily by the new masses of 
downtrodden and marginalised poor. Being spectators instead of actors, passive instead of 
proactive, removes moral and political responsibility for the actions and atrocities perpetrated 
against these unfortunate groups of people (Bauman, In Search of Politics; Society Under Siege, 
201-21). Bauman’s utopia is, as a consequence, a version of the ancient Greek republican society, 
the agora, relatively similar to that proposed by Richard Rorty in his Philosophy and Social Hope 
(1999) as a source for ‘social hope’, where social duties and obligations go hand in hand with 
individual and collective rights as well as securing the fair distribution of material wealth. Bauman, 
though, is no advocate for the aristocratic underpinnings of the ancient republican practice—
excluding women, slaves, and the indolent from participation—but nor is he opting for planned 
economy understood in its communist guise, although the welfare state’s responsibility for the 
redistribution of wealth in his view is a prerequisite for a truly democratic and autonomous society. 
He is rather concerned with the creation of the self-constituted and autonomous society in which 
citizens actively engage in public and political life instead of retreating into their private fortresses 
constructed out of fear. In his description of the emergence of this new ‘culture of fear’, he often 
quotes Marx’ metaphor of the moth, which, when the universal (or one could say global) sun starts 
setting, seeks out the comfort and warmth of the domestic lamp (Bauman, “The Moth Seeks Out the 
Lamp, 21). Bauman is very critical of the tendency for the construction of gated communities 
accompanying such occasional eruptions of collective fear, hysteria, moral panic, and omnipresent 
and free-floating anxieties. 
However, before arriving in England in the early 1970s, Bauman’s vision of utopia was 
markedly different than it is today according to his friend and colleague Stefan Morawski. He 
claimed that Bauman at that time when working in Warsaw embraced a “Marxist worldview in the 
light of the utopian belief and hope that the Soviet Union was genuinely a country of justice, 
equality, freedom; that an ethnic pedigree really did not matter” (30). However, embittered by the 
experience of the Stalinist and anti-Semitic purges in the Polish academia throughout the late 1960s, 
this collectivist utopia was upon arrival in England ultimately disowned. Despite having dissolved 
his relatively orthodox roots to Marxist thinking many years ago, there is little doubt that his early 
training within this tradition has directed his attention to aspects fertile for utopian theorising. The 
utopian vein in his writings from the early years onwards can be seen in the fact that the two major 
tenets in his thinking, he claims, are respectively suffering and culture (Bauman in Kilminster & 
Varcoe, 206). Utopia is central to both of these aspects—as relief from suffering and degradation 
and as the realisation of culture as a human and actively created domain of life instead of an 
enforced iron-cage. As Bauman is well aware, we are not all endowed with the same possibilities 
and life chances in the world. The life chances experienced by what he metaphorically terms a 
‘vagabond’ are by definition extremely different to and incomparable from that of a ‘tourist’ (cf. 
Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 240-42). The former is the label utilised by Bauman to characterise 
the miserable plight of the localised underprivileged people, whereas the latter signifies the 
possibilities and potentials available to the exterritorial elite at the top of the globalised human 
hierarchy. Throughout his many books, Bauman is persistently and categorically always taking the 
side of the weak, as the quality and standards of any society can only be measured and evaluated by 
looking at the condition of the weakest members. 
Thus, for a considerable period of time he hung his utopian hopes exclusively on the 
ideological coat hanger, as it were, provided by socialism and Marxist, and later on a more 
humanistic variant of this ideology. Especially the ‘softer’ kinds of socialism—the humanistic 
variants sympathetic to the opening up of the human world and its infinite possibilities instead of 
attempting to contain it within new modernist iron-cages—appeared to appeal to him after his 
arrival in England. As Keith Tester (2002) has illustrated, the majority of the sources Bauman 
draws upon in his own eclectic work are concerned with utopian visions ranging from, amongst 
others, the work of Antonio Gramsci via Albert Camus to Emmanuel Levinas. These writers are not 
socialists or Marxists in the traditional paradigmatic sense of the term, apart perhaps from Gramsci, 
but they nevertheless contain seeds of the just, fair, equal, and morally responsible society that 
socialism as an ideological discourse was able to monopolise throughout most parts of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We must also not forget the inspirational contribution of 
Cornelius Castoriadis, the importance of Leszek Kolakowski or the equally important contributions 
made by members of the Budapest School in shaping Bauman’s own ideas. For Kolakowski, for 
example, with whom Bauman had to flee the forced utopia of the socialist regime in Poland in the 
1960s, utopia as a way of thinking is in principle a good thing, although fully-fledged utopias 
forced on reality and forged after some authoritarian blueprints or master plans often appear to turn 
into totalitarianism or authoritarian nightmares of state apparatuses trying to force progress on its 
right way (cf. Olson; Rouvillois). Once realised, as Kolakowski points out in “The Death of Utopia 
Reconsidered”, utopias historically have a bad tendency to turn into dystopian or anti-utopian 
ambitions of perfectibility where humans are made to suffer for a dream of total order, purity, and 
submission. This view is similar to the analysis Bauman himself later provides within the realm of 
sociology. Both Bauman and Kolakowski in dialectical fashion transcend radical utopianism and 
anti-utopianism by proposing some sort of synthesis containing elements of both positions. 
Thus, just like Kolakowski, Bauman also possesses an anti-utopian current alongside, or 
rather embedded within his sympathy for utopianism. This anti-utopianism is evident in the way he 
treats especially the erstwhile modernist hopes of creating a better society by way of rational 
planning, the sequestration of individual creativity and freedom, and an annihilation of human 
difference: 
 
The new, modern order took off as a desperate search for structure in a would suddenly denuded of 
structure. Utopias that served as beacons for the long march to the rule of reason visualized a world 
without margins, leftovers, the unaccounted for—without dissidents and rebels; a world in which, as in 
the world just left behind, everyone will have a job to do and everyone will be keen to do the job he has 
to: the I will and I must will merge. The visualized world differed from the lost one by putting assignment 
where blind fate once ruled. The jobs to be done were now gleaned from an overall plan, drafted by the 
spokesmen of reason; in the world to come, design preceded order. People were not born into their places: 
they had to be trained, drilled or goaded into finding the place that fitted them and which they fitted. No 
wonder utopias chose architecture and urban planning as both the vehicle and the master-metaphor of the 
perfect world that would know no misfits and hence of no disorder. (Bauman in Beilharz, The Bauman 
Reader, 195) 
 
Modern utopias sought to dissolve disorder into order and annihilate ambivalence and strangeness 
in their relentless search for structure, symmetry, and neatness. Since both capitalism and socialism 
were children conceived in the cradle of the great project of modernity, they were both doomed to 
follow suit in this respect. This finally made Bauman doubt whether socialism could actually serve 
as the vehicle leading towards an alternative social order in which human culture was not alienating 
and naturalised and in which human suffering was at best eventually eradicated and, more 
realistically, was at least reduced to a bare minimum—although even such a minimum to Bauman 
would be unacceptable. 
 
Utopia as the Critical Counter-Culture and Active Alternative to Capitalism 
When Bauman more than a quarter of a century ago in Socialism: the Active Utopia declared 
that socialism should be understood as the embodiment of the ‘active’ utopia, his intention was to 
point to the transformative quality of this particular political culture instead of an inactive utopian 
doctrine that did not have any bearing upon the structuring of social reality. Such an active utopia 
was to offer the “luxury of unleashing the human imagination and leading it to the distant expanses 
which would never be reached if it were held down by the exactions of the political game” 
(Bauman, Socialism: The Active Utopia, 13). This active utopia was therefore supposed to serve as 
a counter-culture not only of capitalism in particular but equally of modernity in general. For long, 
Bauman saw the Left in general and socialism in particular as this counter-culture of modernity 
(Bauman, “The Left as Counter-Culture of Modernity”; “From Pillars to Post”; Modernity and 
Ambivalence). They grew up together, were victorious together, and eventually decomposed 
together. Already in the early 1980s Bauman saw his high hopes attached to the working class 
movement as the bearer of such an active utopia crushed by the assimilation of these potentially 
revolutionary forces by corporate capitalism (Bauman, Memories of Class) as well as by the 
Stalinist regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski crushing the Solidarnosz uprising in Poland. When Bauman 
in the mid-1970s expressed the hopes of socialism as an active utopia, socialism still proved a 
viable solution to many of the problems faced by modern capitalism such as ‘legitimisation crises’, 
suffering, exploitation and economic recession, but already in the early 1980s these hopes were 
crushed in the throes of death, culminating in the upheavals in Eastern Europe a decade later and the 
definitive dethronement of the state socialist projects.  
These Socialist utopias were the only utopian aspirations ever in history and in large-scale to 
have been put into flesh instead of merely remaining words, as the ancient Greeks expected of their 
classical utopian aspirations, but they were ultimately ‘upturned’ as Noberto Bobbio aptly termed it 
by the forces of reality. In his 1991 study, Peter Beilharz showed exactly how many of ‘labour’s 
utopias’ such as bolshevism, Fabianism, and social democracy failed to deliver and bring about the 
promised mode of production where oppression and alienation altogether disappeared. His analysis 
is indeed inspired by Bauman’s own work on the failed class project of socialism (cf. Bauman, 
Between Class and Elite; Memories of Class). This supposedly world-historical defeat of socialism, 
or the vulgar variant of it practised in the East, however, did not mean that Bauman surrendered his 
socialist convictions and utopian sentiments. On the contrary, they grew increasingly fierce and 
uncompromising. 
Bauman’s personal sympathies and values, though, are no longer exclusively socialist if 
understood in terms of the ideological monopoly of ideas. Rather, they appear to be more 
encompassing and universal humanistic values that especially the Enlightenment philosophers 
espoused despite his often outspoken critique of the excesses of the modernist heirs of the 
Enlightenment. As he stated in an interview conducted a decade ago about the utopian principles (of 
justice and self-assertion) guiding his work: 
 
These principles stay with me all the time—If you call them socialist, fine; but I don’t think they are 
particularly socialist, anyway. They are much wider than that. I really believe that communism was just 
the stupidly condensed and concentrated, naive effort to push it through; but the values were never 
invented by the communists. The values were there, much wider; they were western, Enlightenment 
values. I can’t imagine a society which would dispose of these two values, ever. … Once the ideas of 
justice and self-assertion were invented, it is impossible to forget them. They will haunt and pester us to 
the end of the world. (Bauman in Kilminster & Varcoe, 225) 
 
Therefore, his utopian vision does not, despite his overtly expressed sympathies, rest solely on 
socialist assumptions, although he persistently claims that socialism is still very much part of his 
sociological life-project. This, on the other hand, does far from mean that Bauman has shed himself 
of his socialist sympathies and that he believes that socialism is altogether dead and buried. In a 
more recently conducted interview he presents the following diagnosis of contemporary socialism: 
“Like the phoenix, socialism is reborn from every pile of ashes left day in, day out, by burned-out 
human dreams and charred hopes. It will keep on being resurrected as long as the dreams are burnt 
and the hopes are charred, as long as human life remains short of the dignity it deserves and the 
nobility it would be able, given a chance, to muster. And if it were the case, I hope I’d die a 
socialist” (Bauman & Tester, Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman, 155). His socialism is, 
however, not restricted to conventional ideological manifestos and traditions but it finds an equal 
amount of inspiration in those writers, literary or scholarly, in whose works a socialist sentiment 
runs like an inexhaustible undercurrent and emporium of insights. 
Especially the ‘socialist’ ideas and notions found in certain varieties of French literary and 
postmodernist social thought whether academic or artistic—Camus, Castoriadis, and Levinas—
appear to have inspired Bauman in a more utopian direction (Jacobsen, “Zygmunt Baumans 
‘franske fornemmelser’”), although we must also remember the inspiration critical theory has 
provided for his project. Bauman’s variant of critical thinking is explicated as a way of looking at 
alternatives, just as conventional critical thinking has always attempted to transcend and look 
beyond the confines of capitalism. For example, his description of his understanding and use of 
critical theory clearly contains utopian undercurrents if not downright overtones: 
 
Unlike other theories, critical theory will not be … satisfied with the optimally faithful reproduction of 
the world ‘as it is’. It will insist on asking, ‘how has this world come about?’ It will demand that its 
history be studied, and that in the course of this historical study the forgotten hopes and lost chances of 
the past be retrieved. It will wish to explore how come that the hopes have been forgotten and the chances 
lost. It will also refuse to accept that whatever is, is of necessity; it will suggest instead that the structures 
be explored which perpetuate what is and by the same token render the alternatives unrealistic. It will 
assume, in other words, that until the contrary is proved, reality of some attributes of the world and 
utopianism of their alternatives are both conditional on the continuation of some practices which, in 
principle, can be modified or altered. (Bauman, “Critical Theory”, 280-81) 
 
This is indeed a very poignant summary of the critical and utopian core in Bauman’s own work, a 
self-description of the qualities of social thinking that he wants to stress either overtly or implicitly 
through his sociological practice. Bauman, though, is not a critical theorist per se as he refuses to 
wear the badge of allegiance of or represent any particular traditions or schools of thought. The 
utopian and also adversarial element immanent in many parts of critical thinking is, however, a key 
in understanding the utopian strand that Bauman pursues throughout his books whether he is 
writing a critique of modernity, the characteristics of postmodernity or attempts to draw attention to 
the liquefied contours of contemporary society. Especially his focus on the changed and altered 
social conditions for utopia has been a leitmotif in recent decades where his initial defence of 
Marxist modernity was followed by a merciless critique of modernity (Bauman, Legislators and 
Interpreters; Modernity and the Holocaust; Modernity and Ambivalence), a proposal for some 
intimations of the postmodern era (Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity; Postmodern Ethics; Life 
in Fragments), followed again by a critique of postmodernity and its habitat (Bauman, 
Postmodernity and Its Discontents; Globalization; Work, Consumerism and the New Poor), to 
contemporary illustrations of the contours of a liquid modern landscape (Bauman, Liquid 
Modernity; The Individualized Society; Society Under Siege; Liquid Love; Wasted Lives). Contained 
within these latter pieces of work, apart from their descriptive aspirations, is also a devastating 
critique of liquid modernity—especially because it seems even more hostile to utopias than the eras 
of modernity and postmodernity on the historical shoulders of which it is standing. 
 
From Concrete and Solid to Ethereal and Intangible Utopias 
Although Bauman as a critical social thinker is clearly inspired by and indebted to the 
Enlightenment values, he is at the same time extremely sceptical of their embodiment in actual and 
realised social projects. He cherishes the emancipating, egalitarian, communal and humanistic 
potentials present in European Enlightenment but fears the totalitarian tendency for order, control, 
submission, and supervision latently present. In this dualistic position, which is not marked by 
tergiversation but rather healthy scepticism and ambivalence, he does not stand alone within utopian 
literature. In the preface to his 1997-book Breaking with the Enlightenment, Rajani Kannepalli 
Kanth, for example, writes that “the twentieth century marks the grand culmination, and lofty 
ascendancy, of the high modernist impulse set in motion by remarkable forces, both material and 
metaphysical, unleashed by the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century” (xi). The 
utopian kinship between Bauman and Kanth is indeed obvious as their diagnoses both point to 
‘remarkable forces’ of rationalisation and manipulation prompted by the protagonists of the 
Enlightenment project (cf. Bauman, “Sociological Enlightenment”). One of the major culminations 
of these remarkable modernist forces mentioned by Kanth as well as by Bauman was the creation 
and constitution of the nation state with its territorial boundaries and so-called ‘imagined 
community’ of a variety of culturally different people, as also Benedict Anderson in his Imagined 
Communities (1983) originally and persuasively pointed out. The result of these modernist forces of 
manipulation and rationalisation amongst other things meant order to a world that was hitherto 
plagued by the spectre of strife, which was devoid of structure and marked by the prevalence of 
belief-systems either believing in the power of coincidence or in the worshipping of religious 
providence, etc. According to Bauman’s trilogy on the impact of modernity and modernisation on 
society, this new era encapsulated all these contingencies within its own iron-cage of rational, 
scientific, and technical expertise and discourse that in its obsessiveness sometimes ended in 
genocide and other inhuman atrocities (cf. Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters; Modernity and the 
Holocaust; Modernity and Ambivalence). The utopianism of the modernist ‘good society’ thus 
gestated certain unintended consequences and evil side effects that not only signalled its 
culmination but its own crumbling. 
Whereas European Enlightenment was originally founded upon utopian principles concerning 
liberty, equality, and brotherhood, its apparent culmination in the last century has paradoxically also 
meant the disappearance of utopia and with it the demise of the original trinity of ideas. Modernity 
equally promoted utopia and crushed it—this is Bauman’s dualistic diagnosis; it sought to promote 
solid, totalising, lasting and stable utopias, at the same time as it was setting people free as 
individuals to pursue less concrete and more flimsy and fragmentary routes to utopian living. On 
these new and more free and self-limiting utopias, sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander recently noted: 
“In a plural society, utopias compete with one another. This is a good thing. It is what makes them 
self-limited, and it makes totalization, and totalitarianism, impossible” (581). At the same time, 
however, it also makes more lasting, committing and encompassing utopias unimaginable. When 
collective emancipatory politics (the so-called Politics with a capital P) nowadays is replaced by 
individual life politics (the so-called politics with a small p), the pluralistic utopias eventually come 
to undermine the previously solid variant (cf. Bauman, In Search of Politics). When the State—the 
nation state or the welfare state—surrenders its monopoly on power and welfare provisions to the 
market, the illusion of collective bargaining for the benefit of all citizens is once and for all 
disclosed by its consumerist counterpart either promising individual salvation or personal despair 
depending on one’s position in the new global disorder (cf. Bauman, Work, Consumerism and the 
New Poor). When the safety and security of nationhood is replaced by the insecurities, unsafety and 
insecurities of global living (what Bauman captures under the unitary German heading 
Unsicherheit), the idea of utopia as the common good gives way to utopia as an abstract castle in 
the air (cf. Bauman, Globalization). All of these social, political and economic transformations 
mark the end of modernist utopia and their aspirations and dreams of streamlining humans and 
societies alike. Against this background Krishan Kumar stated that the solid utopias of yesteryear 
were “never simply dreaming” (Utopianism, 2), and Bauman captures the core obsessive concern of 
the demised solid modern utopias and their nightmare consequences when he states that they 
 
were anything but flights of fancy or the waste products of the imagination. They were blueprints for the 
human-controlled world to come, a declaration of the intent to force that world to come, and the serious 
calculation of the means necessary to do it. … A remarkable feature of modern utopias was the attention 
devoted to the meticulous planning of the environment of daily life. … Utopian inventions were strikingly 
similar to each other bearing vivid testimony to the shared obsession that gave birth to all of them: that of 
transparency and unequivocality of setting, capable of healing or warding off the agony of risky choice. 
(Bauman, The Individualized Society, 64) 
 
These modernist utopias, oriented towards the unfolding future of humankind, were erected and 
drafted at a time when the world desperately craved and demanded order, when ambivalence, 
opaqueness and insecurity were to be fought at the borderlands of society as enemies eventually to 
be routed or slaughtered. Thus, 
 
utopia was to be the fortress of certainty and stability; a kingdom of tranquillity. Instead of confusion—
clarity and self-assurance. Instead of the caprices of fate—a steady and consistent, surprise-free sequence 
of causes and effects. Instead of the labyrinthine muddle of twisted passages and sharp corners—straight, 
beaten and well-marked tracks. Instead of opacity—transparency. Instead of randomness—a well-
entrenched and utterly predictable routine. … Utopias were blueprints for the routine hoped to be 
resurrected. (Bauman, Society Under Siege, 229)  
 
In this fashion, solid modern utopias contained a certain core element of premodern routinised 
traditionalism, however this time spiced up with the rational order-making and supervising 
obsession: “Utopia was a vision of a closely watched, monitored, administered and daily managed 
world. Above all, it was a vision of a predesigned world, a world in which prediction and planning 
starve off the play of chance” (Bauman, Society Under Siege, 230). The play of chance and the 
presence of fate in premodernity were in the modern utopian order annihilated and purity, clarity, 
and predictability took its place and came to constitute the unholy trinity of modern utopias. This 
trinity, however, was not religious or metaphysical but the product of the ingenuity, creativity and 
faculty of the people and guided by the means of science and reason. This trinity has now in a 
thoroughly secularised and individualised world-view transformed itself and has been dissolved in 
the hazes of a golden utopian past that cannot be retrieved or resurrected. We still believe in science 
and to some extent also in reason, but today they, as Karl Popper remarked, “rest of shifting sands” 
(Conjectures and Refutations, 34) due to outspread scepticism, uncertainty and competition among 
different expert systems (cf. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity). 
On the overall, we have lost the grand narratives and illusions of modernity, as 
postmodernists all queue to claim. With the disappearance of these narratives we have also lost the 
compass and point of orientation for society and thus modernity’s belief in social engineering for 
the present as well as for the future—even in Popper’s more modest sense of ‘piecemeal social 
engineering’ (Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies). There is no longer anybody located at the 
control panel capable of or interested in steering the societal vessel clear of the multitude of dangers 
lying ahead—among the most terrifying dangers are the Scylla of globalisation and the Charybdis 
of individualisation. Using another metaphor, as Bauman is keen to do, the captain has evacuated 
the cockpit leaving the passengers entirely to their own individual destinies (Bauman, “On 
Globalization”, 38). Simultaneously, the idea of progress has demised and the interest in building a 
better future seems pointless. Since the mastery of the future, as Pierre Bourdieu declared, requires 
a hold on the present, and since this hold has vanished in contemporary society due to increasing 
complexity, individual indifference, and a decline of institutional and political control, any genuine 
hope of planning or shaping the future must therefore be discarded (Bourdieu, Contre-feux). This 
appears to be Bauman’s death sentence on the hope of modern utopias to be projected into the 
future. As mentioned above, however, utopias have not disappeared altogether—their 
morphological outlook and content has changed but changed radically from solid to so-called liquid 
modernity. 
In his recent book Liquid Modernity, Bauman shows how the erstwhile solid aspects of reality 
have now been thoroughly and irreversibly liquefied and lost all shape and direction that previously 
guided society towards a better future. He conducts in-depth analyses of the impact of this process 
of liquefaction on central components of society such as community, individuality, work, 
emancipation, and time/space and he concludes that the liquid modern age does not constitute a 
fertile ground for the grand social projects of the solid modern utopian mentality (Bauman, Liquid 
Modernity). Instead of the certainty and predictability that previously surrounded these 
indispensable components and pillars of society, we are now faced with contingencies and 
uncertainties regarding the persistence of communal shelters, the in-build guarantee of individual 
rights, the durability of personal career options, the push and pull between freedom and ever new 
forms of control and surveillance, and the solidity of time and space. Also at the more intimate 
levels has life been liquefied regarding matters such as love, relationships, sexuality, etc. (Bauman, 
Liquid Love). These changes have a severe and deep impact on utopian aspirations and ideas that in 
liquid modernity are regarded as equivalents to predestination and collective control instead of 
individual freedom of choice and personal satisfaction. In short, in liquid modernity, utopias are 
generally regarded as relics from a shameful past we have finally been able to rid ourselves of. 
Not only out there in social reality have the robust and solid utopias been undermined but also 
within social scientific discourses has the term ‘utopia’ fallen irreparably into disrepute—perhaps as 
an almost synchronised response to the fate of the utopian phenomenon in the real world. Bauman 
himself is suspicious of the myopic understanding that as a consequence has determined the fate of 
the concept of ‘utopia’ within, for example, sociology: 
 
I suspect that in our social-scientific usage all too often we unduly narrow down the concept of ‘utopia’ to 
the early modern blueprints of the good society, understood as a kind of totality which pre-empts its 
members’ choices and determines in advance their goodness, however, understood. … I am now inclined 
to accept that utopia is an undetachable part of the human condition. … I now believe that utopia is one of 
humanity’s constituents, a ‘constant’ in the human way of being-in-the-world. This does not mean that all 
utopias are equally good. Utopias may lead to a better life as much as they may mislead and turn away 
from what a better life would require to be done. (Bauman & Tester, Conversations with Zygmunt 
Bauman, 48-50) 
 
Bauman’s understanding and appreciation of utopia is therefore ambivalent. Utopias may lead to a 
better life but the danger always consists in the historical fact that utopia may also turn from dream 
into nightmare, from social bliss into social repression, from desirable ideal into disastrous reality. 
According to Bauman this ambivalence inherent in utopia is similar to the one present in many 
other key and equally “constant” aspects of social life such as freedom, culture, community, power, 
politics, globalisation, morality, etc. All of these social scientific concepts as well as human 
experiences one the one hand contain an opportunity side and a more sinister side on the other. 
Which of these is eventually realised is dependent upon human intervention and deliberation. 
Instead of proposing, as so many other scholars within the field of utopian studies, that utopia per 
definition is equivalent to something good, Bauman offers an understanding in which only we, the 
human beings destined to live out our lives in the world, can make sure and determine whether or 
not utopia will indeed become something beneficial or something undesirable; only we can point to 
and eventually realise the multitude of alternative visions of ‘the good life’. Therefore, in Lyman 
Tower Sargent’s apt differentiation between the two broad strands of utopian thinking, “utopias 
brought about by human effort” on the one hand, and “utopias brought about without human effort” 
on the other hand (Sargent, “Utopian Traditions”, 8-14), Bauman is clearly in favour of the former, 
as long as these utopias are not forced on people as heteronomous projects or designs. The utopias 
favoured by Bauman are thus of the sort people collectively and freely choose to realise and which 
they dismantle again whenever they no longer offer the comfort, security and satisfaction that 
initially prompted their transformation from idea into reality. Moreover, utopias, in Bauman’s 
understanding, need not necessarily turn from intangible idea into concrete reality in order to have 
an impact on reality. As long as utopian aspirations penetrate thought and inform action, they will 
have consequences on the social world. 
By offering such a re-definition of utopianism as an ambivalent experience and Janus-faced 
concept, Bauman is capable of salvaging some of the lost dignity of utopian thinking as well as 
pointing to the darker side of realised utopias. Thus, throughout the years he has moved from the 
somewhat narrow and conventional understanding to a much more nuanced and encompassing 
notion of utopia as part and parcel of the human predicament and condition without which we 
would stand naked and alone in front of the present radical social changes. In paradoxical fashion, 
this more loose and alternative understanding of utopia appears to be the only solid bulwark against 
ending either in the often inhuman iron-cages of modern utopias again or in the vertigo of relativity, 
individuality, and detachment of liquid modern de-utopianisation. Whereas the credo of the former 
era could be summarised as ‘united we stand, together we fall’, in the latter contemporary period it 
rather spells out a ‘divided we stand, isolated we fall’. 
 
From Collectivised to Individualised Utopias in Life and Death 
The title of one of Bauman’s most recent books, The Individualized Society, tells a comprehensive 
story in itself about contemporary society—a story about where we are coming from, and where we 
are heading. According to Bauman, who in his overall analysis follows in the footsteps of amongst 
others social historian Norbert Elias in his The Society of Individuals (1991), we have moved from 
the era of the great collective, political and social endeavours to individual, apolitical and anti-social 
life projects; from emancipation of the masses to individual salvation, from national unity to global 
fragmentation, from solidified modernity to liquid modernity (Bauman, Liquid Modernity; The 
Individualized Society). Elsewhere, with metaphorical clarity, he characterised this transition from 
collectivity to individuality as a transition from ‘camps’ to ‘tribes’ (Bauman, Life in Fragments) or 
from a focus on ‘imagined community’ to a focus on ‘identity’ (Bauman, Community). A general 
shift in human history has apparently taken place from the anonymous but united grey mass of 
people to the lonely but identifiable individual with his or her self-identity as the core concern of 
the life project, as also Anthony Giddens pinpointed in his Modernity and Self-Identity (1991). This 
shift has been accompanied by a decline in collective, social, political and moral obligations and 
engagements, while, at the same time, utopian aspirations have become thoroughly privatised—
together with fear, anxiety, action, morality, solidarity, and responsibility. 
The Individualized Society constitutes Bauman’s diagnosis of a society in which collective 
responsibility and the social and political institutions outliving the individual have been demolished 
or dismantled. This society is now instead constituted and inhabited by individuals living-with, but 
not living-for, each other, where l’enfer, c’est les autres and where our own routes to happiness 
seem more important than the public responsibilities and obligations. Our liquid modern society 
offers its members a colourful palette of choices, sensations, and options without which life would 
seem dull and without contours but which simultaneously divides, differentiates and fragments 
instead of combining, joining and uniting. In this sense contemporary society is pluralistic and not 
autocratic as in the modern age. At the same time, it is not totalitarian in its traditional sense of the 
term but rather ‘globalitarian’, as Bauman indicates (Society Under Siege, 236). Pluralisation and 
globalisation offer problems for solid utopias but hold promises for more pluralistic, tacit and open-
ended utopias. Jeffrey C. Alexander also captures this point very well: 
 
Utopian conceptions inform and complement the kinds of differentiated and pluralistic social orders we 
inhabit today. For utopias to be ‘real’, it is enough that various conceptions of utopia do, in fact, animate 
the nooks and crannies, the spheres and subsystems, of such a social order. The reality of utopia does not 
(empirically), cannot (theoretically), and indeed should not (normatively) depend on its actual, that is 
complete, realization. (“Robust Utopias and Civil Repairs”, 81) 
 
Thus, for utopia to be real now more than ever merely means that it should to some extent be 
thought of and be present in the back of the minds of individualised individuals or pluralistically 
oriented institutions. Utopia does not have to be realised, crystallised and materialised as a specific 
social order but it should, at least, be a latent possibility and active alternative to the present. 
Although this liquid modern society is pluralistic, a view that Bauman certainly would support, it is 
still an open question whether it is also an autonomous society, as he, together with Castoriadis and 
Levinas, would like it to be. If Bauman in his earlier years wanted socialism to play the role of an 
active counter-culture of modernity and capitalism, as we saw above, today he wishes a morality of 
proximity and a responsibility for society’s weakest members to serve as the active counter-culture 
of liquid modern consumerism and its hidden heteronomous agenda disguised as an autonomous 
society. 
Not only the life-course of people but also their bidding for immortality, the eternal mirror of 
man’s earthly existence, has according to Bauman been privatised and individualised throughout the 
last couple of centuries—a process increasingly intensified throughout the last few decades. 
Previously, in premodernity, immortality was the sole privilege of writers and rulers whose deeds 
would go down into the annals of history and thus remain part of the collective memory for the 
future. At this time, also the religious notion of the ‘chosen people’ dominated, promising collective 
but still exclusive immortality. In modernity, this privilege was gradually democratised and 
subcontracted by the State to increasing parts of the population such as those soldiers and other 
heroes serving the common cause, the family, the nation, the race or the party. However, the 
immortality of the unique individual would drown in the particularity of the grander cause, for 
which he or she lived and died, or in the vast mass of people willing to die for it. Everybody was, 
for all practical purposes and intents, disposable and nobody apart from the great leaders lingered in 
collective memory for long. Today, these past routes promising symbolic immortality have been 
blocked once and for all and the new alternatives appear to be as individualised as they are 
insufficient and short-termed. All bridges leading to exclusive, lasting or collective immortality 
have effectively been undermined and those few leading to or promising individual immortality are 
overcrowded by lonely individuals desperate for their right to fifteen minutes of fame. Ultimately, 
nobody reaches immortal bliss because it is now, in principle, available to all (Bauman, Mortality, 
Immortality and Other Life Strategies, 51-87; Liquid Modernity, 126-29; The Individualized 
Society, 238-50). With immortality out of the question—and being replaced by the less ambitious 
survivalism (Bauman, “Survival as a Social Construct”)—the entire life-span becomes over-loaded 
with expectations, high hopes and demands, which in turn leads to an instrumental view on how to 
squeeze the lemon in order, individually and immediately, to get the most out of it. This leads to 
fear, frustration and frequently erupting collective manifestations of hysteria and uncertainty where 
scapegoats and strangers in general are made to suffer for our lack of control of the future and of the 
present condition. 
How does this apparently novel social condition, and the mentality accompanying it, relate to 
the issue of utopias? For centuries, utopian thought was guided largely by either religious or 
ideological ideas about the links between life and death, sins and deeds, the present and the eternal, 
rights and responsibilities, the individual person and the cosmic or collective order. These deep-
seated and serious links are severed in the individualised society leaving utopian notions of a social 
alternative without solid anchorage—with the fearful and free-floating individual as their only point 
of departure and port of destination. Therefore, Bauman proposes that these indispensable links are 
re-established and that only a re-politicisation, re-moralisation, and re-institutionalisation of society 
can achieve this. Here the classical Greek republican agora serves as a central frame of reference 
and ideal in which the oikos (the private household) and the ecclesia (the public and political realm) 
can meet, ideas can be developed through undistorted communication, and constructive dialogue 
and problems relating to the well-being of the whole community can be solved (Bauman, In Search 
of Politics, 86-100). In a thoroughly individualised society, such collective republican aspirations 
oriented towards a betterment of the existence of everybody appear as relics from premodernity or 
modernity, as nothing but a waste of time, and leave lonely souls searching in vain for solidarity, 
community, commitment, and compassion.  
The combined effort towards a re-politicisation, re-moralisation and re-institutionalisation of 
contemporary individualised and globalised liquid modernity envisaged by Bauman entails first and 
foremost a willingness to substitute the personalised and privatised ‘life politics’ focusing on the 
Self with ‘emancipatory politics’ directed towards the plight of Others. Hereby we would support 
the extension of political participation, democracy, liberty, and equality to ever larger proportions of 
contemporary society both on a local and national scale as well as on the global scene. Second, it 
means the penetration of a self-sacrificing moral responsibility and universal sense of obligation 
into every nook and cranny of the world—a moral responsibility that does not stop at one’s own 
private doorstep and which does not stop short of offering help to the new liquid modern masses of 
marginalised, downtrodden and redundant people, the so-called human waste of our age (Bauman, 
Wasted Lives). Finally, it requires that political and social institutions capable of envisaging long-
term visions, of undertaking continuous and collective commitments, and willing actively to 
undertake the endeavour be erected. Moreover, that these institutions build on the principle of 
democratic participation and the aspiration to transform people from de jure into de facto 
individuals. This would amount to a transformation of their social and political position by 
guaranteeing them formal freedom as well as positive rights with the accompanying opportunities 
and abilities to act according to their ambitions, desires, and dreams. These institutions should 
mirror the multitude and variety of human dreams and desires as well as reflect and allow for the 
many alternative routes towards utopia while refraining from authoritatively pointing to one narrow 
and straight path towards utopia. 
The current individualisation of utopias can be interpreted optimistically, as many libertarian 
postmodernists have tended to do, or pessimistically, as many socially concerned modernists or 
critical theorists traditionally have showed a predilection for. Bauman, as well as other scholars 
working within a critical social and sociological position, have pointed to the constant tension 
between optimism and pessimism and placed themselves in an intermediary and somewhat 
ambivalent position. One of those contemporary scholars belonging to the same latter betwixt and 
between category as Bauman is Oskar Negt, the German social thinker, who has described how 
“social utopias have crawled into the individual; the quite overwhelmed individual must understand 
all chasms to society as creative possibilities for a recreation of objective conditions” (Arbeit und 
menschliche Würde, 621)[my translation]. Apart from posing new possibilities, this new situation 
also places a burdening yoke of endless reflexivity and vigilance on the shoulders of individuals 
enjoying the almost unbearable lightness of being. In the thoroughly individualised society, the 
individual who, with Donald W. Winnicott’s illustrative terminology from Playing and Reality 
(1999), is brought up to believe himself to be ‘omnipotent’, instead finds himself impotent and 
isolated. Bauman wants to show us how an unrestrained freedom of choice and insular individuality 
can liberate as well as crush our hopes and dreams. He wants to show us how anti-social and self-
sufficient solipsism does not lead to individual salvation but to social suffering, how one-
dimensional living makes us believe that there is no alternative, and how the demand for instant 
gratification and a life in the shadow of the eternal present is oblivious to past mistakes and 
problems as well as future possibilities and potentials. Here his variant of utopianism can point to 
some, admittedly sporadic, solutions for societies and individuals alike—together and not apart. 
 
The Utility of Bauman’s Utopia 
After this documentation and delineation of the specific utopian strand and development in 
the sociology of Zygmunt Bauman, some tentative conclusions pertaining to utopian thought in 
general might be required. Years ago, Herbert Marcuse in his classic Das Ende der Utopie (1967) 
declared utopia as a historical dynamic dead and buried due to the apparent impossibility of 
fundamentally transforming the social world even though we possess the intellectual and material 
means to do it. He believed that a ‘total mobilisation’ of opposition against achieving such a 
potential utopian transformation was instigated by capitalist society. However, this burial of utopia 
appears to have been conducted prematurely. Utopia is not dead but it has itself undergone a radical 
transformation and even a proliferation in recent years. Bauman’s sociology is merely one of these 
relatively novel utopian strands compared to the classical formulations and traditions.  
One of the scholars who has attempted to categorise different traditions of utopian thought is 
Darko Suvin who differentiated between three main strands in his classification of utopian thought. 
First, he believed the major group to be constituted by what he termed “empirical or sociological 
utopians”. This group generally consists of geographers, urban planners, politicians and scholars 
working within the fields of applied social science. Second, we find the so-called “fictional or 
literary utopians”, who are often found working within literary theory, women’s studies, ecological 
perspectives and science fiction genres. Finally, the intermediary position placed between this so-
called “two-headed monster” is occupied by “utopian philosophy” (Suvin, “Locus, Horizon, and 
Orientation”, 124-26), and it is here in this latter category, I suggest, we locate the work of Bauman 
who, although he is a sociologist, does not belong to the first category normally the natural 
environment for sociologists. The reason for this intermediary positioning is that Bauman is not 
concerned with constructing concrete and erecting empirical utopias but instead he is interested in 
philosophically pinpointing the possibilities of an alternative social vision. However, this vision is 
not entirely fictional and unrealistic but instead requires that people in reality are willing actively to 
change their ways and in unison to alter the existing social arrangements into a more morally 
responsible and politically responsive situation. His utopian vision is, as mentioned above, an 
‘active’ vision, which, if followed, would have radical repercussions for social reality as we now 
know it. 
Thus, Bauman’s utopianism is much more implicit than explicit; he is neither ideologically 
one-sided nor does he swear allegiance to some utopian authority and tradition. As Robert Musil 
remarked in his marvellous novel The Man Without Qualities and which very well captures 
Bauman’s perspective on utopia more aptly than he himself has perhaps explicated: “A utopia … is 
not a goal but an orientation” (Musil in Suvin, “Locus, Horizon, and Orientation”, 131). Bauman is, 
as mentioned, not alone in defending such an open philosophical utopian understanding or 
‘orientation’ and his utopianism, as the above by no means exhaustive account has illustrated, 
consists of a mosaic of different impressions and inspirations from sympathetic social thinkers. For 
example, German philosopher Ernst Bloch, one of the vintage utopian thinkers, proposed some 
similar points of view (cf. Jacobsen, “Ikke endnu”), as well as some of the key French social 
thinkers who with their insistence on resistance and the defence of human dignity, autonomy and 
alternatives also exposed a philosophical utopian orientation (cf. Jacobsen, “Zygmunt Baumans 
‘franske fornemmelser’”). Thus, the utopian element derives as much vigour and inspiration from 
the ‘French connection’ constituted by Camus and his literary focus on the ability to act differently, 
Castoriadis and his political vision of the truly autonomous society and the autonomous individual 
equally being a precondition for each other, and Levinas and his appreciation of the moral 
responsibility developed through human proximity, as to some of the major ideas advanced by 
critical theory or humanistic Marxism. They all share, in different guises and to different degrees, a 
concern with central utopian ideals—not as something heteronomous imposed on people but as a 
vision of the autonomous society in which individuals possess the positive freedom and the 
effective means of changing the prevailing state of affairs according to their own hopes, dreams and 
desires. In this fashion, Bauman’s utopianism is also an expression of what Danish philosopher Ole 
Thyssen in his Utopisk dialektik (1976) years ago, in a detailed study of utopianism, aptly termed 
“the integrated utopias” in which a utopian dialectic is embedded within different liberating theories 
and strategies but which in themselves do not draw a precise and definitive picture of a specific 
utopian future (Utopisk dialektik, 9-10).iv 
As mentioned above, Bauman’s utopianism is, however, not a purely speculative enterprise at 
the same time as it is not a solid political agenda or manifesto. In his intermediary position he also 
shares some similarities with the “utopian realism” advocated by Anthony Giddens (The 
Consequences of Modernity, 154-58). In spite of its apparent juxtaposition of contradictory terms, 
utopianism and realism, utopian realism nevertheless means an openness to the unrealised and 
immanent aspects of reality that through deliberate human effort and collective action could be 
realised and be consequential for contemporary social arrangements in much the same way as 
Marx’s classical version of critical theory. Despite claims that utility is not a suitable standard by 
which utopian notions should be measured, as they supposedly defy such quantitative and 
calculative logic, it must nevertheless be discussed to what extent Bauman’s diagnosis and 
rehabilitation of utopian ideas can inform social action and have an impact on reality. Bauman’s 
utopianism, although it is critical of any embodied materialisation of utopia, needs somehow to be 
carried out instead of merely remaining imagination, wishful thinking or dreaming. Thus, as he 
states in one of his most recent books, Liquid Love, in which he stands forth as a spokesperson for a 
‘global community’, “imagination tends to turn into a tangible, potent, effective integrating force 
when aided by socially produced and politically sustained institutions of collective self-
identification and self-government” (Liquid Love, 148). In this way we can see the contours of how 
his utopianism could have a transformative bearing upon liquid modern individualised, globalised 
and consumerist reality if social and collective institutions underpinning it were constructed and 
maintained. A change away from the widespread cynical, self-sufficient and consumerist ideology 
(or rather non-ideology) of neo-liberalism and free-floating economic globalisation demands solid 
political institutions which, on a world-scale, can diminish human suffering and promote universal 
values of compassion and moral responsibility. The modernist attempts at enforcing utopia often 
ended in the opposite—tyranny and human suffering—but if we altogether cease to imagine a 
different world, then the now liquefied modern reality will eventually end up being as solid as its 
historical predecessor. 
In sum, Bauman’s utopianism can be characterised as a ‘tacit utopianism’ together with the 
utopianism underpinning the works of the likes of pragmatist Richard Rorty, the aforementioned 
critical theorists as well as the described French literary writers and philosophers. They do not 
overtly defend utopias but do not refrain from voicing utopian ideas either. Moreover, Bauman does 
not utilise any special tricks, literary techniques or models of thought through which to express his 
utopianism—it is a plain, unpretentious and down-to-earth variant where some element of 
dialectical thinking (and hence overcoming and transcending) is involved. Opposed to this tacit 
understanding and appreciation of utopia stands the more ‘overt utopianism’ in which one’s utopian 
convictions are openly expressed. In spite of their aforementioned utopian similarities, Bloch 
would, contrary to Bauman, belong to this camp because he would envisage a certain and somewhat 
closed state of affairs when utopia was eventually to be implemented (cf. Jacobsen, “Ikke endnu”). 
Bauman is very sceptical about such theorising that, due to some historical logic, requires concrete 
implementation and unfolding. Despite being relatively sceptical about the implementation and 
embodiment of utopias and their tendency to be parading as potential totalitarian ideologies in 
disguise, also Leszek Kolakowski is capable of seeing the possibilities inherent in utopias for 
human purposes when he cryptically remarked: “The existence of a utopia as a utopia is the 
necessary prerequisite for its eventually ceasing to be a utopia” (Marxism and Beyond, 92). Only by 
being presented by its proponents and protagonists as utopia, as something desirable immediately or 
ultimately to be realised, will tacit utopias paradoxically cease to be utopian. This is also Bauman’s 
understanding. 
Many interpreters claim that Bauman’s books in recent years have been oozing of an 
increasing pessimism, which has meant that his utopian aspirations despite always holding out the 
torch of hope have come close to the apocalyptic exclamations voiced by many other contemporary 
social thinkers such as communitarians, critical theorists and concerned aficionados of ecological 
protection (cf. Jacobsen, Zygmunt Bauman—den postmoderne dialektik, 331-337; “Sociologi, utopi 
og modernitet”). Perhaps these two strands of thought, the utopian and the apocalyptic, have 
blended in the work of Bauman and of others, as Rumanian poet Emile Cioran sceptically 
suggested: “The two genres, utopian and apocalyptic, which once seemed dissimilar to us, 
interpenetrate, rub off on each other, to form a third, wonderfully apt to reflect the kind of reality 
that threatens us” (History and Utopia, 98). Bauman’s utopianism is an expression of this third 
hybrid genre, this ambivalent attitude towards utopias as well as towards reality. He has often been 
accused of ambivalence, ambiguity, and tergiversation, which also necessarily relate to his notion of 
the desirability or undesirability of utopia. This tendency, however, is not so much a matter of 
Bauman’s own thinking as part and parcel of the nature of the social world in modernity as well as 
in later modernities. As Kwang-Ki Kim, in his recent book Order and Agency in Modernity, rightly 
observed: 
 
Such ambivalence has often been held against one or another modern theorist, for example, as a symptom 
of personal confusion or inconsistency, but it now needs to be recognized that modernity is complex and 
multi-faceted; any insightful analysis, and especially any penetrating evaluation, should recognize and 
reflect this complexity. It is not a question of personal confusion about an unambiguous phenomenon, but 
a question of personal insight into a phenomenon which is in many respects ambiguous. (109) 
 
Bauman’s sinister yet hopeful vision of a world emptied of concrete and totalitarian utopias but still 
leaving room for utopian ideas and imagination of alternative realities echoes the equally 
ambivalent view expressed by Karl Mannheim when he stated the sombre premonitions of a reality 
entirely deprived of the utopian spirit: 
 
The complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and action would mean that 
human nature and human development would take on a totally new character. The disappearance of 
utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes nothing more than a thing. … 
Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is 
ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man’s own creation, with the relinquishment of 
utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it. (Ideology and 
Utopia, 236) 
 
This quotation, to my mind one of the most central of descriptions and observations on utopia ever, 
also embellishes the end of the most comprehensive and monumental sociological delineation of 
and introduction to utopian and anti-utopian thought (cf. Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern 
Times). At the same time, it equally captures Bauman’s heritage from and inheritance to 
sociological understandings of utopia. Bauman’s utopian optimism, despite accusations of the 
contrary, is unassailable even in times of trouble and despite expressed pessimism from time to 
time, his optimism equals that of German Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer who, awaiting 
execution in a Nazi concentration camp, stated: 
 
Optimism is by its nature 
not a goal for the present situation 
but a life-force, 
a force for hope when others give up, 
a force withstanding setbacks, 
a force that never surrenders the future to pessimism 
but rather requisitions it for hope. 
 
This lyrical extract captures the essence of the hope that a tacit utopianism can and must contain in 
times that are hostile to this kind of allegedly futile thinking. Here Bauman’s vision can help us 
reinvigorate utopia—the nowhere—within sociology and perhaps even elsewhere. 
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i Also Russell Jacoby, in a vein similar to Judith Shklar in her After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith from 1957, 
recently pointed out the devastating effects of the loss of utopian ideals as well as the cause behind this loss when he 
stated that “world events and the Zeitgeist militate against a utopian spirit—and have for decades. … Its sources in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
imagination and hope have withered away” (The End of Utopia, 179). This diagnosis is similar to Bauman’s and to 
other concerned social thinkers of our time. 
ii As Tester, one of the finest contemporary interpreters of the work of Bauman today, suggested: “Within his sociology, 
Bauman tries to show that the world does not have to be the way it is and that there is an alternative to what presently 
seems to be so natural, so obvious, so inevitable” (Tester in Bauman & Tester, Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman, 
9). This is exactly the mark of distinction of Bauman’s sociology whether it is concerned with scientific dogmas 
constraining humanity in envisaging alternative modes of action (cf. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology) or in 
dealing with specific social arrangements obstructing the realisation or actualisation of such modes (cf. Bauman, 
Socialism: The Active Utopia; Society Under Siege). 
iii Even those scholars opposing positivism, Marxism, functionalism, behaviourism, and other major paradigmatic 
schools of thought within sociology throughout the last century were sceptical of utopianism. Dahrendorf, an exponent 
of conflict theory and critic of the dominant school of structural functionalism, in his famous article “Out of Utopia: 
Towards a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis” accused utopianism, when regarded as the construction of social 
order, of undermining analyses of social conflict and change and instead focussing on stability, status quo, harmony, 
uniformity, universal consensus, and the insular status of utopian communities. These so-called ‘structural 
characteristics’ of most sociological theories at that time hampered apparently an understanding of the changeability 
and instability of societies and overshadowed an appreciation of the role of conflict, Dahrendorf convincingly argued. 
Utopia, to him, was almost equivalent to a graveyard but he somewhat humorously admitted that “the difference 
between utopia and a cemetery is that occasionally some things do happen in utopia” (“Out of Utopia”, 117). However, 
the alleged utopianism of structural functionalism is miles away from the more philosophical utopianism of Bauman 
discussed throughout this article. 
iv Dialectical thinking has been an inherent part of Bauman’s work throughout the years in which he has been oscillating 
between the real and the possible, the hideous aspects or reality and the desirable possibilities. A certain sense of 
dialectical thinking is embedded within most of his concepts and arguments that allows for transcendence of the 
limitations of what is generally regarded as real, true, rational, and right. (For a more comprehensive coverage of 
Bauman’s special sociological dialectic, see chapters 5 and 7 of Jacobsen, Zygmunt Bauman—den postmoderne 
dialektik). 
